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A NATION GOING UNDER: LEGAL 
PROTECTION FOR “CLIMATE  
CHANGE REFUGEES” 
XING-YIN NI* 
Abstract: Climate change-related disasters displace millions of people each 
year. Small island states in the Pacific have become emblematic of the problem 
because they are among the most impacted and the most vulnerable. Often por-
trayed by global media as drowning beneath the sea, these states are struggling 
for their very survival. Many of their residents are looking to move overseas, 
but face a lack of legal options to migrate. A test case in New Zealand from a 
Kiribati national claiming to be a “climate change refugee” highlights the diffi-
culty of fitting climate-induced migrants into the Refugee Convention mold. To 
grant refuge, deemed the persecutor, would have turned the refugee paradigm 
on its head. This case reveals the wide protection gap left by existing domestic 
and international laws for those hoping to flee their sinking homes. To fill this 
gap, it will be essential for domestic, regional, and multilateral bodies to proac-
tively work together in developing and implementing effective strategies for 
migration.  
INTRODUCTION 
Sinking islands in the Pacific, drowning deltas in South and Southeast 
Asia, desertification across the West African Sahel and Mexico, and extreme 
weather events occurring with increasing frequency around the world—
climate change-driven natural hazards are displacing millions of people each 
year.1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted in 
its first assessment report in 1990 that the “gravest effects of climate change 
may be those on human migration.”2 Experts now estimate that by 2050, 200 
                                                                                                                           
 * Xing-Yin Ni is the Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
 1 See Benoit Mayer, The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration: Pro-
posal for an International Legal Framework, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 363–65 
(2011); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Dis-
placement, ¶¶ 1–2 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4da2b5e19.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QK7H-A9G9 [hereinafter Summary of Deliberations]. 
 2 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/
shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/DRR-CCA-Policy-Paper-Final.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/C3FF-P2TN; Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: 
Implications for International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 607, 618 (2009). The IPCC is the a scien-
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million or more people will be displaced from their homes due to climate 
change.3 
Accounts of displaced migrants have received widespread and often 
sensationalized media attention.4 In particular, the so-called “sinking island” 
phenomenon has become symbolic of the plight.5 Those displaced by climate 
change are often inaccurately dubbed “refugees,” which is a legal term of art 
that does not extend protection to those forced to relocate for environmental 
reasons.6 Current international law does not provide climate-induced migrants 
with mechanisms to secure resettlement rights or financial assistance.7 This 
wide gap left by law and policy has provoked vigorous academic debate and 
numerous proposals to address the problem.8 Although no single solution has 
been effective, recent developments suggest that the international community 
is making progress.9 
Part I of this Note explores the complex relationship between climate 
change and migration, particularly in the Pacific island nation of Kiribati. Part 
II discusses a recent claim for “climate change refugee” status in New Zea-
land, which highlights the broad scope of climate-induced migration and the 
                                                                                                                           
tific body established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) that provides assessment on the current state of knowledge 
in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. IPCC, http://www.
ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml#.Uu5O6SjHk5Q (last visited Apr. 4, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L2NQ-3QLZ. 
 3 See Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global 
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60, 68 (2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, If a Country Sinks Beneath the Sea, Is It Still a Country?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/08/23/23climatewire-if-a-country-sinks-beneath-
the-sea-is-it-sti-70169.html, archived at http://perma.cc/F3VF-KQSF; Jeffrey Goldberg, Drowning 
Kiribati, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-21/
kiribati-climate-change-destroys-pacific-island-nation, archived at http://perma.cc/8A6K-C3MD; Gar-
diner Harris, Facing Rising Seas, Bangladesh Confronts the Consequences of Climate Change, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-bangladesh-
confronts-the-consequences-of-climate-change.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0, archived at http://perma.
cc/2WUG-GG9L; Vanessa O’Brien, When Kiribati Disappears, We’re Going to Die With Our Kids, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.dw.de/when-kiribati-disappears-were-going-to-die-
with-our-kids/a-17282402, archived at http://perma.cc/7EVY-PHNM. 
 5 See JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
119–27 (2012) (discussing the impacts of climate change on island states through case studies of 
Kiribati and Tuvalu, two small Pacific island nations). 
 6 See id. at 42; Oli Brown, Migration and Climate Change, 31 IOM MIGRATION RES. SERIES 
1, 13–14 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/migration_climate.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AD5Z-YPJZ. 
 7 Sheila C. McAnaney, Note, Sinking Islands? Formulating A Realistic Solution to Climate 
Change Displacement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1172, 1174 (2012). 
 8 See id. 
 9 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 268; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, High Commissioner’s 
Closing Remarks: 2010 Dialogue on Protection Gaps and Responses, at 2 (Dec. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4d0732389.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TC4E-FQJL [hereinafter Closing 
Remarks]. 
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limited scope of international refugee law. This Part also explores existing 
forms of protection for climate-induce migrants beyond the Refugee Conven-
tion. Part III examines the limitations of past litigation and considers alterna-
tive legal recourses that may be more effective for the Pacific region. This 
Note concludes by suggesting that a combination of legal and policy ap-
proaches—national, regional, and international—will be most successful at 
protecting persons fleeing from climate-induced environmental threats. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Climate Change and Migration 
Scientists have established with increasing certainty that greenhouse gas 
emissions by industrialized nations are largely to blame for climate change.10 
In 2014, the IPCC assessment report stated that “[w]arming in the climate 
system is unequivocal” and human influence is “extremely likely to have been 
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-twentieth centu-
ry.”11 Although humans have long turned to migration to cope with environ-
mental and climatic change, climate-induced migration today is particularly 
troublesome because of the speed with which it is predicted to occur and the 
vast number of people it is poised to affect.12 As a result, the rate and scale of 
climate-induced migration will likely exhaust the traditional adaptive capacity 
of many human communities, placing them in vulnerable positions.13 For 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI, NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAM OF ACTION, at iii (Jan. 2007), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B7K3-PSUE 
[hereinafter NAPA]; Brown, supra note 6, at 12. The NAPA is an approach to enable least devel-
oped countries to communicate their immediate and urgent needs for adaptation to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties. NA-
PA, supra, at iii. 
 11 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2, 4, 47 (Rajendra K. Pachaur et al. 
eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_
full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZC8N-29GZ (“Human influence has been detected in warm-
ing of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow 
and ice, and in global mean sea level rise . . . .”). 
 12  See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION NO. 18: 
CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND MIGRATION 17 (2012), available at 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/RB18_ENG_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RXT9-
R94Q; Jane McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Displacement Treaty is Not the 
Answer, 23 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 2, 2–3 (2011). In the Pacific region, there have been reloca-
tions of at least eighty-six whole communities, primarily driven by environmental factors. See 
MCADAM, supra note 5, at 143. 
 13 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
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those facing environmental displacement, migration has become a “survival 
mechanism of last resort.”14 
Adding to the urgency of the problem is the fact that environmental dis-
placement disproportionately impacts developing countries, which already 
face a lack of food and mobility options.15 The sad irony confronting develop-
ing states is that, though they have contributed the least to greenhouse gas 
emissions, they will ultimately bear the brunt of the burden.16 Small island 
developing states are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, 
given their limited territory, susceptibility to extreme weather events, and lack 
of resources to adapt to the effects of climate change.17 Continued sea level 
rise is expected to compound coastal hazards, such as storm surges and ero-
sion, and to place the longevity of island communities at risk.18 The quality of 
water resources and human health are predicted to suffer as a result of climate 
change, as are the viability of fisheries and coral reefs.19 The experience of 
Kiribati, a small atoll state in the Pacific, is emblematic of many of these 
challenges.20 
B. Kiribati: A “Sinking” Nation 
For Kiribati, one of the world’s lowest-lying nations, the Atlantis legend 
could become a reality.21 Located halfway between Australia and Hawaii in 
the Pacific Ocean, Kiribati is a string of 32 coral atolls and one island that 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Gil Marvel Tabucanon & Brian Opeskin, The Resettlement of Nauruans in Australia: An 
Early Case of Failed Environmental Migration, 46 J. PAC. HIST. 1, 20 (2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851910, archived at http://perma.cc/A4U3-BTZK. 
 15 Katherine H. Regan, The Case for Enhancing Climate Change Negotiations with A Labor 
Rights Perspective, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 271–72 (2010); U.N. High Comm’r for Refu-
gees et al., Joint Submission: Human Mobility in the Context of Loss and Damage from Climate 
Change: Needs, Gaps, and Roles of the Convention in Addressing Loss and Damage, at 2 (Oct. 
22, 2012), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/igo/106.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/656E-R7TU [hereinafter Human Mobility]. 
 16 Brown, supra note 6, at 31; see Katrina Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 
37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167, 174–75 (2013). 
 17 See Roger McLean et al., Small Islands, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION 
AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT RE-
PORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 689, 705 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 
2007), available at https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter16.pdf, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/CB83-4Z27. 
 18 See id. at 689. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 119. 
 21 Id. at 123; Lucy Craymer, New Zealand Court Rejects ‘Climate Change’ Refugee: Justice 
Calls Pacific Islander’s Claim ‘Novel’ but Insufficient, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304465604579221030617117194, archived at http://
perma.cc/QXV3-46Q3. Atlantis was “a legendary island, beautiful and prosperous, which sank 
into the sea.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 101 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 
2001). 
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straddles the Equator.22 The atolls reach a maximum of three to four meters 
above sea level, with most of the state only one to two meters above sea lev-
el.23 Climate change threatens to erode habitability in the nation through fre-
quent storm surges, coastal erosion, and increased salination.24 The rate of sea 
level increase in the western Pacific is quadruple the global average, and cli-
mate scientists agree that the sea level surrounding Kiribati will only continue 
to increase.25 According to a World Bank study, most of Tarawa, the nation’s 
capital, will be submerged by 2050 if new adaptation measures are not adopt-
ed.26 
Yet climate change is not the only factor threatening Kiribati’s long-term 
viability.27 The United Nations (UN) has classified the nation as one of the 
world’s forty-nine least developed countries based on three measures: pov-
erty, human resource weakness, and economic vulnerability.28 Unemployment 
is staggering; less than a quarter of the population have jobs.29 Most of the 
people of Kiribati, who are called the I-Kiribati, survive through subsistence 
farming of indigenous tree crops.30 Their livelihoods are thus highly vulnera-
ble to coastal erosion, salination of soil, and other impacts of climate change 
on natural resources.31 Kiribati’s problems are compounded by its rapid popu-
lation growth.32 Half of Kiribati’s population of 103,000 lives on the main 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Gyles Beckford, Pacific Man Seeks Climate Change Asylum in New Zealand, REUTERS 
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKBRE99F05A20131016, archived at http://
perma.cc/Y3R6-U529. 
 23 NAPA, supra note 10, at 4; Tony Abbott, Man Seeks Refugee Status in New Zealand Over 
Global Warming: Pacific Islander Claims Rising Sea Levels Have Made It Too Dangerous to Go 
Home, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023041
06704579136561870305846, archived at http://perma.cc/4Q6T-9Z95. 
 24 MCADAM, supra note 5, at 44; NAPA, supra note 10, at 5. Salination, or salinization, is the 
process of increasing the salt content in soil, eventually reaching a level that is toxic for plant life. 
See NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SOIL QUALITY RESOURCE CON-
CERNS: SALINIZATION (1998), available at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/
nrcs142p2_053151.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9KLJ-57Y4. 
 25 Bernard Lagan, Kiribati: A Nation Going Under, APMEN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.
apmen.iom.int/en/m/blogs-and-opinions/266-kiribati-a-nation-going-under, archived at http://perma.
cc/V2C4-7466. 
 26 See AF (Kiribati) v Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the Dep’t of Labour [2013] NZIPT 
800413, ¶ 23; Lagan, supra note 25. Some suggested measures for Kiribati to adapt to the rising 
seas include constructing sea walls and planting mangroves. See Lagan, supra note 25. 
 27 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 124–25. 
 28 Id. at 124. 
 29 Id. at 125. 
 30 NAPA, supra note 10, at 4; Maryanne Loughry & Jane McAdam, Kiribati—Relocation and 
Adaptation, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 51, 51 (2008), available at http://www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR31/51-52.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W6KB-JQBM. 
 31 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 125. 
 32 Id. at 124. 
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island of Tarawa, the nation’s capital and urban center.33 Many have relocated 
there from the eroding outer islands in search of employment, causing the 
atoll’s population density to rise above that of London, Hong Kong, and 
Bangladesh.34 
Infrastructure has not kept pace with population growth, and overcrowd-
ing has led to resource depletion and poor sanitation.35 Runoff during heavy 
rains contaminates the groundwater, as does the human waste of squatters in 
Tarawa who live atop the atoll’s main source of fresh water.36 Climate scien-
tists predict that states like Kiribati will become uninhabitable because of di-
minished water supplies many years before their landmasses disappear be-
neath the sea.37 Lack of clean water coupled with lack of a functional sewage 
system has contributed to the spread of disease, such as cholera, dengue fever, 
diarrhea, and fish poisoning.38 Climate change-induced increases in tempera-
ture and sea level are only expected to make disease even more frequent and 
severe. 39 In its most recent roundtable deliberation on climate change and 
displacement, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (UNHCR) described how climate change “interacts with several global 
mega-trends, such as population growth, human mobility, urbanization, as 
well as food, water and energy insecurity” to multiply and accelerate migra-
tion and displacement.40  
The Kiribati government is desperately seeking to fight back against the 
devastation of climate change, displaying advertisements proclaiming “Adapt 
or perish!”41 Kiribati’s president, Anote Tong, has explored countless measures 
to counteract and adapt to climate change.42 For several years, Kiribati has 
been building sea walls, and in 2011, President Tong traveled to Japan to 
learn about the possibility of constructing a floating island.43 Nonetheless, he 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id.; Jeffrey Goldberg, Drowning Kiribati, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/169372-drowning-kiribati, archived at http://perma.cc/B2
EX-DZ8B. 
 34 MCADAM, supra note 5, at 124–25; Lagan, supra note 25; Goldberg, supra note 33. 
 35 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 125. 
 36 NAPA, supra note 10, at 16; Lagan, supra note 25. Kiribati’s main source of potable water 
is the groundwater lenses, which are “the shallow underground bubble in which fresh water gath-
ers when rain seeps through the ground.” Lagan, supra note 25; see also NAPA, supra note 10, at 
15–16. 
 37 MCADAM, supra note 5, at 124. 
 38 See NAPA, supra note 10, at 19. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Summary of Deliberations, supra note 1, ¶ 2. 
 41 Lagan, supra note 25. 
 42 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 124 n.35, 137, 146, 202–03. 
 43 See id. at 137; Lagan, supra note 25 (“A week earlier Tong had again garnered international 
headlines by putting forward a bizarre scheme that involved building floating metal islands off the 
Kiribati coast, at a cost of $2 billion.”); Introduction of Mega-Float, SHIPBUILDING RES. CENTRE 
2015] Climate Change Refugees 335 
has stated that his nation has only thirty to sixty years of habitability left and 
has called for a policy of “migration with dignity.”44 Claiming Kiribati is “be-
yond redemption” and “at the point of no return,” President Tong has encour-
aged neighboring states to open their doors to I-Kiribati who must flee their 
home country.45 The gradual and staggered resettlement of I-Kiribati would 
be beneficial to both Kiribati and receiving countries: “[m]igration can help to 
relieve population pressure and fill skills shortages in other countries, thus 
providing a win-win situation.”46 
Despite the push for external migration, the citizens of Kiribati do not 
wish to be labeled as refugees.47 The term “refugee” evokes “a sense of help-
lessness and a lack of dignity which contradicts the very strong sense of Pa-
cific pride.”48 Tessie Eria Lambourne, Kiribati’s foreign secretary, has stated, 
“[w]e do not want to be called refugees because that is very painful for both 
the people involved and those who are seeking help and those who are help-
ing people look for new homes.”49 Similarly, President Tong said in an inter-
view, “when you talk about refugees—climate refugees—you’re putting the 
stigma on the victims, not the offenders.”50 
As explained more fully below, the I-Kiribati and legal scholars alike 
have criticized the use of the term “refugee” to describe persons fleeing cli-
mate change.51 Although talk of “climate change refugees” and islands disap-
pearing under the sea are effective political tools in climate negotiations, 
these images also contribute to misunderstandings about the nature of climate 
change-related migration.52 By perpetuating a narrative of vulnerability, they 
                                                                                                                           
JAPAN, http://www.srcj.or.jp/html/megafloat_en/whatmega/what_index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/YB8K-G57P. 
 44 Lagan, supra note 25 (“There’s no doubt that Tong’s doomsday scenario for his nation—and 
his savvy media skills—have generated much attention for Kiribati. In late 2011 the United Nations 
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, also focused international attention when he visited South Tarawa 
and planted mangroves to ward off sea erosion.”). 
 45 Id. (“Some saw the president’s rhetoric as overblown, designed to garner more international 
aid for Kiribati, and to summon world leaders to do more to arrest the rate of climate change by 
setting definite time frames for reducing greenhouse emissions.”); see also MCADAM, supra note 
5, at 202 (“The long-term strategy of the government of Kiribati is to secure ‘merits-based migra-
tion’ options to neighbouring countries like Australia and New Zealand, so that those who wish to 
move permanently have an early opportunity to do so. In this way, the President hopes that ‘pock-
ets’ of I-Kiribati communities will build up abroad and I-Kiribati culture and traditions will be 
kept alive.”). 
 46 MCADAM, supra note 5, at 202–05. 
 47 See id. at 40. 
 48 Id. at 40–41. 
 49 Lagan, supra note 25. 
 50 MCADAM, supra note 5, at 41. 
 51 See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 12, at 10; MCADAM, supra note 5, at 40; 
Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Refugees in International Law, 30 L. & 
POL’Y 502, 522–23 (2008). 
 52 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 120, 123. 
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have the potential to diminish the adaptation efforts of states like Kiribati and 
contribute to “a sense of fatalism that accelerates the[ir] demise.”53 Yet the 
use of the term “climate change refugee” continues to be widespread, and 
there have been several asylum cases in Australia and New Zealand in recent 
years where citizens of Pacific islands have attempted to claim refugee pro-
tection for climate change impacts.54 All have failed.55 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The “Climate Change Refugee” 
The legal difficulties of classifying persons displaced by climate change 
as “refugees” are highlighted in a recent asylum case heard in New Zealand.56 
In Ioane Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and 
Employment, a Kiribati man pursued his claim to be a “climate change refu-
gee” all the way to the High Court of New Zealand and the Court of Appeal 
of New Zealand.57 Although other immigrants had made similar claims in the 
past, Teitiota’s bid was the first to reach these two appellate bodies.58 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 120. 
 54 See, e.g., Refugee Appeal Nos. 72189–72195/2000 [2000] Refugee Status Appeals Authori-
ty 1, ¶ 8 (N.Z.), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d08cf7f2.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/4QQE-PZ26; 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168, ¶ 22 (Austl.), available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/4b8fdd952.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EF4Y-7PQQ. 
 55 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 56 See André Leslie, Kiribati Asylum Case Highlights Legal Void on ‘Climate Refugees,’ 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 24, 2013), http://dw.de/p/1A551, archived at http://perma.cc/J7YH-
D6CP; see also Ioane Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t [2013] 
NZHC 3125 (explaining the Tribunal and High Court’s rejection of Teitiota’s claim that he consti-
tuted a refugee under the Refugee Convention). 
 57 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶¶ 17, 34–40; Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., 
Innovation & Emp’t [2014] NZCA 173. Established in 1841, the High Court of New Zealand has 
general jurisdiction and responsibility for the administration of justice throughout New Zealand. 
N.Z. MINISTRY JUSTICE, http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/high-court/high-court-home (last visited 
Apr. 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N835-8UD2. Its jurisdiction extends over both criminal 
and civil matters, and it deals with cases at first instance or on appeal from other courts and certain 
tribunals. Id. Established in 1862, the Court of Appeal is New Zealand's intermediate appellate 
court. N.Z. MINISTRY JUSTICE, http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/court-of-appeal (last visited Apr. 
4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8Y9Y-KSMB. “Matters appealed to the High Court from a 
District Court and certain tribunals can be taken to the Court of Appeal with leave if a second 
appeal is warranted.” Id. 
 58 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, at ¶ 45; cf. Tara Brady, World’s First Climate Change Refugee: 
Pacific Islander Asks New Zealand for Asylum as He Claims His Home Will Be Engulfed By Ris-
ing Seas, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2464282/Climate-
change-refugee-Pacific-Islander-asks-New-Zealand-asylum.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8HTF-
3UWM (describing Teitiota’s appeal to the High Court as a claim to be the world’s first climate 
change refugee). 
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Ioane Teitiota, a native of Kiribati, was born on a low-lying atoll located 
north of Tarawa.59 Like many residents of outlying atolls, he moved to the 
capital city after high school in search of opportunity.60 Unsuccessful in his 
search for work, he subsisted instead through fishing and farming.61  His 
brother-in-law, who worked in a local government agency in South Tarawa, 
provided him and his wife with supplemental financial support.62 Teitiota saw 
few prospects for his family in Kiribati and immigrated to New Zealand in 
2007 with his wife.63 After overstaying their work permits, they remained in 
New Zealand without legal status.64 Their three children were born in New 
Zealand, but are not birthright citizens because of a 2005 amendment to the 
Citizenship Act 1977.65 Arguing that rising sea level and environmental deg-
radation forced them to leave Kiribati, Teitiota applied for refugee status un-
der section 129 of New Zealand’s Immigration Act 2009 and was promptly 
denied.66 His appeal to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal was similarly 
dismissed.67 He and his lawyer persisted, and arguments for his application 
for leave to appeal to the High Court of New Zealand were heard on October 
16, 2013.68 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, at 1; AF (Kiribati) v Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the Dep’t of 
Labour [2013] NZIPT 800413, ¶ 23. 
 60 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 23; MCADAM, supra note 5, at 124.  
 61 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶¶ 23, 28. 
 62 See id. ¶¶ 28, 32. 
 63 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 19. 
 64 See id. Teitiota’s first attorney failed to advise him that by overstaying his work permit for 
more than forty-five days, he was ineligible to apply for another visa in New Zealand. See 
O’Brien, supra note 4. 
 65 Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 19, 6 n.10; see Citizenship Act 1977, § 6, 1977 S.N.Z. 61 (N.Z.) 
(amended 2005). Under the Citizenship Amendment Act 2005, an individual born on or after Jan-
uary 1, 2006, can only be a citizen by birth if at least one of the individual’s parents is a New 
Zealand citizen or permanent resident. Citizenship Act 1977, § 6(1)(b), 1977 S.N.Z. 61; Teitiota, 
NZHC 3125, at ¶ 19 n.10. All of Teitiota’s children were born after 2007 and do not meet this 
requirement Teitiota, NZHC 3125 ¶ 19 n.10. Prior to this amendment, all persons born in New 
Zealand on or after January 1, 1949, were birthright citizens. Id. 
 66 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶¶ 1–2, 76; Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶¶ 15–16. Teitiota’s application 
for protected person status under section 131 of the Immigration Act 2009 was similarly denied. 
AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶¶ 1–2, 96. 
 67 See id. ¶¶ 1, 98. Established by the New Zealand Immigration Act of 2009, the Immigration 
and Protection Tribunal is an independent body that hears appeals regarding residence class visas, 
deportation, and refugee claims. N.Z. MINISTRY JUSTICE, http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/immig
ration-protection-tribunal (last visited Apr. 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HE5X-ABZR.  
 68 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, at 1. Section 245 of the Immigration Act 2009 permits a party to 
apply to the High Court for leave to appeal on the ground that the Tribunal’s decision was errone-
ous on questions of law. Id. ¶ 35. 
338 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 38:329 
The High Court was tasked with determining whether Teitiota met the 
legal criteria to be recognized as a refugee under New Zealand law.69 New 
Zealand defines refugee in accordance with Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 
associated 1967 Protocol, as a person who: 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is una-
ble or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the pro-
tection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it.70 
Refugee status confers not only legal status to remain in the host country 
and a promise to not be forcibly returned to the country of origin, but also 
certain legal rights.71 Parties to the Refugee Convention typically provide ref-
ugees with access to courts, education, work authorization, and travel docu-
ments.72 
1. Identifying a Persecutor 
An initial challenge for Teitiota was that the cause of his displacement—
climate change—was not human. 73  The Refugee Convention requires an 
identifiable, human actor to cause the harm.74 In addition, the persecutor must 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See id. ¶¶ 12–16, 40. Teitiota also asked the High Court to consider claims related to his 
children. Id. ¶ 40. These were dismissed because they were not questions of law appropriate for 
the High Court’s jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 59–62. 
 70 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, opened 
for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; see Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 4. 
New Zealand defines “persecution” as “the sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights 
demonstrative of a failure of state protection.” Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 8. 
 71 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Introductory Note to Convention and Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees 1, 3 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/
PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BBV4-FDUR [hereinafter Introduc-
tory Note]. The prohibition against expelling a refugee to a country where his or her life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of one of the five protected grounds is referred to as the non-
refoulment obligation. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 72 See Introductory Note, supra note 71, at 1, 3. 
 73 See AF (Kiribati) v Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the Dep’t of Labour [2013] NZIPT 
800413, ¶¶ 54–55; Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t [2014] 
NZCA 173, ¶ 24 (referencing Teitiota’s statement that “I do not fear persecution except for the 
persecution of mother nature.”).  
 74 See Refugee Convention, supra note 70, art. 1. 
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be a government actor or a non-state actor that the government is unwilling or 
unable to control.75  
It is difficult to fit climate change into the persecutor mold.76 For envi-
ronmental migrants, it is unlikely that their home governments will have 
abandoned them to the throes of climate change; in fact, governments are 
likely to assist them in coping with the impacts.77 Teitiota conceded that the 
government of Kiribati was taking measures to adapt to climate change, such 
as purchasing additional territory and building sea walls.78 Nonetheless, he 
argued that the government was “powerless to stop sea-level rise” and was 
thus unwilling or unable to deal with climate change.79 In addition, there was 
an absence of state protection in response to Kiribati’s overpopulation, a sec-
ondary act of indirect human agency.80 These arguments did not bring Teitiota 
under the Refugee Convention, however, because he failed to present any 
evidence that the government of Kiribati did not “take adequate steps to pro-
tect him from such harm . . . .”81 
Significantly, Teitiota also identified the international community—
particularly the industrialized states—as a persecutor, responsible for causing 
two centuries of carbon emissions that contributed to rising seas and changing 
weather patterns.82 Rejecting this argument, the High Court found that the 
international community simply lacked any element of motivation to harm 
low-lying states like Kiribati.83 
2. Well-Founded Fear 
The Refugee Convention also requires that the fear of persecution is 
well-founded.84 The standard for well-founded fear, articulated in Chan v. 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, is entirely objective and requires 
“‘a real chance’ . . . as distinct from a remote chance, of persecution occurring 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id.; Mayer, supra note 1, at 381. 
 76 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 45. 
 77 Wyman, supra note 16, at 179; see generally Jessica Lucia Frattaroli, Note, A State's Duty 
to Prepare, Warn, and Mitigate Natural Disaster Damages, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 
173 (2014) (exploring whether a state has a duty to prepare for, warn of, and mitigate natural dis-
aster damages). 
 78 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 30. “Indeed, the Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati governments remain 
willing to protect their citizens, although the extent of their ability to do so over time is unclear.” 
MCADAM, supra note 5, at 45. 
 79 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶¶ 30, 51. 
 80 See Ioane Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t [2013] NZHC 
3125, ¶ 46. 
81 AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 75. 
 82 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶¶ 46, 55, 57; MCADAM, supra note 5, at 41–42. 
 83 Cf. Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 55 (incorporating the Australia Refugee Review Tribunal’s 
reasoning that high carbon emitters are not persecutors under the Refugee Convention). 
 84 See Refugee Convention, supra note 70, art. 1. 
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. . . .”85 To bolster his fear of persecution, Teitiota presented ample evidence 
of the effects of climate change in Kiribati.86 The Tribunal accepted Teitiota's 
evidence "in its entirety," but did not find evidence that his fear of future per-
secution was objectively well-founded.87 If Teitiota and his family returned to 
Kiribati, their lives would not be in jeopardy and his brother-in-law would be 
able to provide his family with continued support.88 Although their standard 
of living would be less than what they experienced in New Zealand, there 
was no evidence that Teitiota would face any physical danger in Kiribati or be 
unable to provide his family with food or water.89 
3. The Five Protected Grounds 
Refugee status is limited to those who face persecution “for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”90 Another fundamental difficulty Teitiota encountered was that the 
environmental impacts from climate change are largely indiscriminate and do 
not differentiate on account of one of the five Refugee Convention grounds.91 
The effects of environmental degradation are felt by the entire population of 
Kiribati, rather than by Teitiota individually.92 Although the Tribunal acknowl-
edged that “the environmental degradation caused by both slow and sudden-
onset natural disasters” in Kiribati is a “sad reality,” that reality did not bring 
Teitiota’s experience within the scope of the Refugee Convention.93 
The High Court did recognize that “there is a complex inter-relationship 
between natural disasters, environmental degradation and human vulnerabil-
ity,” and that climate change could, in another case, produce a “tenable path-
way” to protection under the Refugee Convention.94 In fact, the Tribunal ex-
plicitly rejected a presumption against applicability of the Refugee Conven-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 169 CLR 379 (Austrl.); 
see AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 53. 
86 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶¶ 5–35. The Tribunal accepted evidence from the 2007 
NAPA; John Corcoran, an expert on the economic and cultural impacts of climate change 
on the population of Kiribati; Teitiota; and his wife. Id. 
 87 See id. ¶¶ 38, 53, 72–74. 
 88 See id. ¶ 74. 
 89 See id. ¶¶ 73–74. 
 90 See Refugee Convention, supra note 70, art. 1. 
 91 See Ioane Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t [2013] NZHC 
3125, ¶¶ 26, 28. 
 92 See id. ¶ 30; AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 75. 
 93 AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 75. Sudden-onset disasters include “flooding, cyclones, storm surges, 
water-logging, salinity intrusion, and riverbank erosion,” and slow-onset disasters include “processes 
like coastal erosion (predominantly through rising seas, but also hydrological dynamics) and land 
loss.” MCADAM, supra note 5, at 163. 
 94 Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 27; see also AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 55. 
2015] Climate Change Refugees 341 
tion to those displaced by climate change.95 The Tribunal emphasized that the 
particular facts must be examined on a case-by-case basis.96 For example, 
refugee protection may be available if environmental issues gave rise to armed 
conflict targeting a particular segment of the population or to politicized hu-
manitarian relief that discriminated against a particular social group.97 As long 
as a convention ground exists contemporaneously with environmental degra-
dation, “the Refugee Convention . . . does not require that persecution be the 
sole, or even the main, reason for the displacement; it only requires that there 
is persecution.”98 
4. Outside the Country 
Furthermore, refugee status is limited to those who have crossed interna-
tional borders, disqualifying internal migrants.99 Empirical evidence shows 
that most of the world’s climate-induced displacement will be internal—those 
affected will remain within the borders of their home country.100 Although 
Teitiota qualifies as someone outside the country of his nationality, the I-
Kiribati who remain within national borders would necessarily be precluded 
from seeking refugee status in the first place.101 
In addition to his claim under the Refugee Convention, Teitiota also 
submitted that he had a right to protection in New Zealand under the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement as an internally displaced person 
(IDP).102 Developed by the UNHCR in 1998, the Guiding Principles were 
created to protect and assist those internally displaced by environmental dis-
asters.103 Principle 15 provides that IDPs have: 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 64. 
 96 See id. 
 97 Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 27. 
 98 Mayer, supra note 1, at 369. 
 99 See Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Displacement and the Role of International Law and 
Policy, in INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE ON MIGRATION 2011 THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION: BUILDING 
CAPACITIES FOR CHANGE INTERSESSIONAL WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEGRADATION AND MIGRATION 2 (2011), available at https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/
shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/climate-change-2011/SessionIII-Paper-McAdam-Session.
pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/KDZ2-9DRX. 
 100 See McAnaney, supra note 7, at 1178. 
 101 See Refugee Convention, supra note 70, art. 1; Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 24. 
 102 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 23; AF (Kiribati) v Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the Dep’t 
of Labour [2013] NZIPT 800413, ¶ 45; Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, at 1 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
 103 See U.N. UNIV., CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: RETHINKING POLICIES FOR ADAP-
TATION AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 57 (Michelle Leighton et al. eds., 2011), available at 
https://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/8468, archived at https://perma.cc/P7SJ-LUYD; Robert McLeman, 
Climate Change, Migration and Critical International Security Considerations, 42 IOM MIGRA-
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  (a) The right to seek safety in another part of the country; 
  (b) The right to leave their country; 
  (c) The right to seek asylum in another country; and 
  (d) The right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement 
in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at 
risk.104 
Although they are formally recognized by many international organizations 
and appear in a number of international agreements, the Guiding Principles, 
as a soft-law instrument, are not binding under international law.105 
Dismissing Teitiota’s argument that he was entitled to protection as an 
IDP, both the Tribunal and the High Court stated that the Guiding Principles 
do not apply once an individual has crossed international borders.106 Further-
more, the Refugee Convention by definition does not apply to IDPs simply 
because they are not “outside their country of nationality.”107 The Tribunal 
also pointed out that even if Teitiota had migrated within Kiribati instead of to 
New Zealand, he would not have been an IDP.108 Although there was “some 
degree of compulsion in his decision to migrate,” Teitiota’s move was “a vol-
untary adaptive migration” and not “forced” as required by the Guiding Prin-
ciples.109 
5. The Result 
Although the High Court called Teitiota’s arguments “[n]ovel and opti-
mistic,” they were ultimately “unconvincing.” 110  The High Court refused 
leave to appeal and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal.111 The court ex-
pressed concern that deciding in favor of Teitiota would open the floodgates 
to millions of others facing similar hardships caused by climate change.112 
The High Court emphasized that the legislature, not the court, is tasked with 
determining whether to alter the scope of the Refugee Convention.113 
                                                                                                                           
TION RES. SERIES 1, 31 (2011), available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS42.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/R66N-QDGM. 
 104 See Guiding Principles, supra note 102, at 8. 
 105 See Human Mobility, supra note 15, at 4; McLeman, supra note 103, at 32. Although IDPs 
are entitled to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from state authorities under the 
Guiding Principles, the UNHCR has limited IDP protection to those “who, if they had breached an 
international border, would be refugees.” Mayer, supra note 1, at 380. 
 106 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 23; AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 46. 
 107 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 24; AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶¶ 45–49. 
 108 See AF, NZIPT 800413, ¶ 49. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 51. 
 111 Id. ¶¶ 63–64. 
 112 See id. ¶ 51. 
 113 See id. 
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The High Court ultimately characterized Teitiota not as a “climate 
change refugee,” but as a “sociological refugee” who sought to “better his life 
by escaping the perceived results of climate change . . . .”114 The Refugee 
Convention did not apply to him and is not well suited to protect environmen-
tal migrants generally.115 
The High Court did consider, however, that environmental degradation 
in Kiribati raised humanitarian concerns for Teitiota and his three New Zea-
land-born children.116 In New Zealand, an immigrant may be permitted to 
stay if “there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that 
would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the appellant to be deported from 
New Zealand” and permitting the immigrant to stay “would not in all the 
circumstances be contrary to the public interest[.]”117 The court acknowl-
edged that unfortunately, Teitiota was precluded from evoking humanitarian 
grounds as he had overstayed his work permit.118 This leaves open the ques-
tion of whether a migrant who is legally present in New Zealand could invoke 
humanitarian grounds in another case.119 New Zealand currently does not 
have humanitarian visas specifically available to persons displaced by climate 
change, but has “expressed its commitment to ‘respond to climatic disasters 
in the Pacific and manage changes as they arise.’”120 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See id. ¶ 54. 
 115 See id.; Wyman, supra note 16, at 177–79. According to legislative history and interpreta-
tive guides, drafters of the Convention “recognized natural calamities as major causes of human 
migration and purposefully declined to extend refugee status to the victims of such events.” U.N. 
High Comm’r for Refugees et al., Joint Submission: Forced Displacement in the Context of Cli-
mate Change: Challenges for States Under International Law, at 9 (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/049.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LF8W-TFL9 
[hereinafter Forced Displacement]; Jeanhee Hong, Note, Refugees of the 21st Century: Environ-
mental Injustice, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 332 (2001). But see Maria Stavropoulou, 
Drowned in Definitions?, 31 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 1, 11–12 (2008), available at http://www.
fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR31/11-12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/236N-UQAH (advancing 
the position that “[t]here is nothing inherent in the ordinary meaning of the word ‘refugee’ that 
would suggest that people fleeing flooded homes . . . should not be considered as refugees.”). 
 116 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 42. 
 117 Section 207 of the Immigration Act 2009 (N.Z.). Under international human rights law, 
humanitarian protection obligations that are more expansive than the refugee category are referred 
to as “complementary protections.” Jane McAdam, The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on 
Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 3 MIGRATION STUDIES 131, 135 (2015). 
 118 See Teitiota, NZHC 3125, ¶ 43. 
 119 Cf. id. ¶¶ 43–44. 
 120 MCADAM, supra note 5, at 116. 
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6. The Second Application for Leave to Appeal 
Teitiota and his lawyer refused to accept defeat.121 On January 30, 2014, 
two months after the High Court denied leave, Teitiota applied for leave to 
appeal with the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.122 Under section 245 of the 
Immigration Act 2009, a party may appeal to the Court of Appeal on a ques-
tion of law when the High Court refuses leave.123 Although the focus of the 
appeal should be on the decision of the Tribunal below, rather than the judg-
ment of the High Court, the Court of Appeal relied heavily on the High 
Court’s reasoning.124 The Court of Appeal endorsed the High Court’s decision 
and similarly declined leave on all six proposed questions of law.125 Express-
ing sympathy for the people of Kiribati and emphasizing that “[n]o-one should 
read this judgment as downplaying the importance of climate change[,]” the 
Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that the Refugee Convention “is quite 
simply not the solution to Kiribati’s problem.”126 
B. The Climate-Induced Migrant 
Despite years of discourse, there is still no formal legal definition of 
who constitutes a climate-induced migrant.127 The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), the leading inter-governmental organization in the field 
of migration, has chosen to define environmental migrants broadly, as: 
[p]ersons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sud-
den or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects 
their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual 
homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and 
who move either within their country or abroad.128 
                                                                                                                           
121 See Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t [2014] NZCA 173, 
¶ 1. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. ¶ 3. 
124 Id. ¶¶ 4, 25, 28, 31, 35. The Court of Appeal also commended the Tribunal’s deci-
sion, describing it as “admirably well structured, carefully reasoned and comprehensive 
. . . .” Id. ¶ 7. 
125 See id. ¶¶ 25, 28, 31, 35, 36, 42.  
126 Id. ¶¶ 21, 40, 41.  
 127 See Mayer, supra note 1, 367–68. The first definition of environmental migrants was in-
troduced in 1985. Human Mobility, supra note 15, at 3 n.6. 
 128 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: AS-
SESSING THE EVIDENCE 19 (Frank Laczko et al. eds., 2009), available at http://publications.iom.
int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N8SD-TFQF. Ac-
cording to its website, the IOM “works to help ensure the orderly and humane management of 
migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for 
practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in 
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The phenomenon is difficult to quantify.129 Experts have criticized the 
methods used to approximate the number of environmental migrants world-
wide, particularly the oft-cited 200 million figure.130 Estimates are “heroic 
extrapolations” that attempt to quantify internal and external displacement, 
both temporary and permanent in nature.131 Furthermore, the relatively slow 
onset of climate change makes it difficult to distinguish between voluntary 
and forced migration.132 
An inherent difficulty in seeking effective responses to climate-induced 
migration is the extremely broad scope of the concept.133 This Note does not 
hope to develop solutions for all situations of environmental displacement, 
but instead focuses on best strategies for the Pacific region. 
C. The International Legal Framework 
As Teitiota illustrates, under current law persons displaced from their 
home country due to climate change have no right to remain permanently in 
another country.134 Although many states have existing temporary protection 
schemes, persons who are permanently and externally displaced by climate 
change unquestionably face a protection gap in the law.135 Those who immi-
grate to another state without legal permission face an uncertain future with-
out access to basic rights necessary for survival such as work authorization, 
healthcare, or social services.136 Given that the poorest and least-developed 
                                                                                                                           
need, including refugees and internally displaced people.” IOM, http://www.iom.int/cms/about-
iom (last visited Apr. 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9TPD-PQJW. 
 129 See Gov’t Office for Sci., London, Final Project Report, in FORESIGHT: MIGRATION AND 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 11 (2011), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-
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 130 See id.; Biermann & Boas, supra note 3, at 68. 
 131 McAnaney, supra note 7, at 1178; Forced Displacement, supra note 115, at 3. Walter 
Kälin has categorized five types of climate-induced displacement: “‘(i) Sudden-onset disasters 
such as flooding . . . (ii) Slow-onset environmental degradation’ due, for example, to sea level 
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and ‘(v) [U]nrest seriously disturbing public order, violence or even armed conflict’ due to grow-
ing resource scarcity.” Wyman, supra note 16, at 171 (emphasis added). 
 132 See ROGER ZETTER, PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: DEVELOPING 
THE CAPACITY OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS 4 (2011), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/4da2b6189.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W7GX-PXDJ. 
 133 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 268 (discussing the many forms of climate-related move-
ment and the difficulty of finding a single response). 
 134 See Ioane Teitiota v Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t [2013] NZHC 
3125, ¶¶ 41–62; Wyman, supra note 16, at 177. 
 135 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 100–03; Zetter, supra note 132, at 4. 
 136 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 121. 
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nations are most vulnerable to climate-induced migration, many states will 
reach a point when domestic solutions will simply not be enough.137 
In light of national insufficiencies, there has been much debate over 
what responsibility the international community has to fill this gap.138 The 
primary justification for international involvement is a positivist argument 
based on treaty obligations.139 In 1992, the UN negotiated an international 
environmental treaty at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED).140 The resulting United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides that “developed country 
Parties . . . shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adap-
tation to those adverse effects.”141 The UNFCCC and other international cli-
mate change laws do not directly address the needs of climate-induced mi-
grants, however, because they only focus on adaptation and mitigation ef-
forts.142 For citizens of small island states, the mounting concern is what pro-
tection will be available once they can no longer adapt to climate change and 
must instead flee their home countries.143 
1. Multilateral Responses 
Recent years have seen an increasing willingness to address climate-
induced migration through international responses.144 Several proposals have 
surfaced, ranging from binding multilateral instruments to policy recommen-
dations.145 Bolstering these efforts, statements by multilateral bodies express 
a commitment to addressing the protection gap.146 In 2010, the Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC negotiated 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Mayer, supra note 1, at 374–75. 
 138 See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 90. 
 139 See Mayer, supra note 1, at 375. Positivism is defined as “the theory that laws are to be 
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 144 See Closing Remarks, supra note 9, at 2; Forced Displacement, supra note 115, at 1. 
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the Cancun Adaptation Framework.147  This framework was the first UN-
FCCC instrument that explicitly recognized climate migration.148 Paragraph 
14(f) invites parties to adapt “[m]easures to enhance understanding, coordina-
tion and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, 
migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional 
and international levels[.]”149 Underlying the Cancun Adaptation Framework 
is the understanding that the current international legal framework remains 
inadequate to protect climate-induced migrants.150 
The following year, a set of ten recommendations—the Nansen Princi-
ples—were developed at the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and 
Displacement in the 21st Century. 151  The Nansen Principles, particularly 
Principle IX, address the protection gap that exists for externally displaced 
individuals and the need for international action.152 In response, the Nansen 
Initiative was launched in October 2012, spearheaded by Norway and Swit-
zerland.153 The goal of the Initiative is to develop consensus among interested 
states about how to address cross-border displacement most effectively.154 
Whereas the Nansen Principles focused on the sudden-onset events, the Nan-
sen Initiative also addressed the slow-onset impacts of climate change that 
lead to forced displacement.155 
The UNHCR has also called for “collaborative approaches and partner-
ships based on principles of international cooperation and burden- and re-
sponsibility-sharing” in addressing climate change.156 It has recognized that 
when states are unable to meet the basic needs of their citizens, international 
humanitarian organizations have a responsibility to step in.157 In February 
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2011, the UNHCR hosted the Bellagio Deliberations, a series of expert 
roundtables on climate change and displacement.158 Both the Bellagio Delib-
erations and the Nansen Initiative emphasize that regional responses to cli-
mate change displacement are vital and recognize that the international com-
munity has a role in assisting and coordinating these regional efforts.159 
2. Regional Responses 
Regional intergovernmental organizations have led the effort in develop-
ing instruments to address climate change in the Pacific.160 For example, 
leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum convened in 2005 to endorse the Pacific 
Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change (PIFACC).161 The PIFACC 
seeks to increase the resilience of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories 
(PICT) to the impacts of climate change by raising awareness of the issues 
and guiding the implementation of practical adaptation measures.162 In 2008, 
the Pacific Islands Forum endorsed the first climate change declaration in the 
region.163 The Niue Declaration on Climate Change was designed to bridge 
the different regional initiatives in the Pacific.164 It focused on requesting ac-
tion from the international community and specifically encouraged “Devel-
opment Partners to increase their technical and financial support for climate 
change action on adaptation, mitigation and, if necessary, relocation[.]”165 
The Niue Declaration also reflected the Pacific region’s focus on retaining its 
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“social and cultural identity, and the desire of Pacific peoples to continue to 
live in their own countries, where possible.”166 
Another regional body, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environ-
ment Programme (SPREP), hosts an annual Pacific Climate Change 
Roundtable (PCCR) to coordinate dialogue between the PICT and global 
stakeholders in the area of climate change.167 In 2007, SPREP formed the 
Pacific Alliance for Sustainability Program in partnership with the Global 
Environment Facility, an organization that provides grants to developing 
countries for climate change projects.168 Since then, the alliance has secured 
forty-five million dollars for climate change adaptation and mitigation pro-
jects in the Pacific.169 
In November 2010, Kiribati hosted leaders from twelve countries and 
adopted the Ambo Declaration.170 The Ambo Declaration expressed “[a]larm 
at the impacts of the climate change crisis already being felt . . . especially the 
immediate threat to the livelihood and survival of the most vulnerable 
States[.]”171 The parties emphasized their support for “the development and 
implementation of strategies and actions directed at protecting people dis-
placed within or across borders as a result of adverse effects arising from cli-
mate change extreme events[.]” 172 
There are also initiatives that specifically provide citizens of Kiribati and 
other Pacific islands with opportunities to migrate.173 These programs are tra-
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ditional immigration schemes, however, and were not designed with a mind 
towards international obligations to protect Pacific peoples from climate 
change displacement.174 Australia, for example, has aid programs to train nurs-
es and horticultural workers in Kiribati to aid their transition into the Australi-
an workforce.175 In 2002, New Zealand created the Pacific Access Category 
(PAC), which offers seventy-five places a year to migrants from Kiribati, in 
order to “promote economic development in Pacific island States[.]”176 To be 
eligible to register for PAC, citizens must meet age, employment, English 
language, health, and character requirements.177 
D. Legal Obligations Under Customary International Law 
Absent formal instruments creating legal rights for climate-induced mi-
grants, another possible source of protection lies in custom.178 Customary 
international law is legally binding, created through the pattern and practice 
of states over time and motivated by opinio juris—a sense of legal obliga-
tion.179 Whether opinio juris has formed is determined by assessing, among 
other things, legislation, case law, and statements on behalf of the govern-
ment.180 There is no required number of states that must engage in a practice 
before it becomes custom.181 In fact, custom can form at a regional level and 
become binding for only states in that region.182 Hence, the practice of “spe-
cifically affected states” is of particular significance.183 Just as a series of 
harms can rise to the level of persecution under refugee law, a series of ac-
tions by Pacific states to protect environmentally displaced individuals could 
rise to the level of regional custom.184 
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It remains a source of controversy whether states have obligations under 
custom to protect individuals who fall outside the Refugee Convention.185 A 
number of scholars contend that the principle of non-refoulement, which pro-
hibits the forced return of individuals to countries in which they are at risk of 
serious human rights violations, has developed into a customary international 
norm.186 Some extend this further, supporting the idea that the prohibition on 
refoulement has risen to the level of a jus cogens norm.187 Meanwhile, others 
criticize such contentions as “wishful legal thinking” and argue that refugee 
protections do not exist under customary international law.188 Even if recog-
nized as custom, it remains to be seen whether the non-refoulement obligation 
would offer protection to individuals fleeing climate change.189 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Repercussions of Teitiota’s Failed Claim 
Ioane Teitiota and his attorney tested the limits of international refugee 
law, only to learn that current law offers no protection.190 The definition of 
refugee as provided in the Refugee Convention could not be extended to in-
clude a person fleeing the dangers of climate change when those dangers 
were not caused by at least one of the five enumerated grounds.191 Further-
more, the persecutor was not, as required by the Convention, the Kiribati 
government or a non-state actor the government was unable or unwilling to 
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control.192 To accept, as Teitiota argued, that the international community was 
an indirect human actor causing sea level rise would “completely reverse the 
traditional refugee paradigm.”193 Teitiota was seeking refuge in the very place 
he deemed to be a persecutor.194 Nor did he face a well-founded fear of future 
persecution if he and his family returned to Kiribati, because he would not 
suffer any sustained or systematic violation of his basic human rights.195 
Although many similar claims had failed before, Teitiota’s case was the 
first to fail after being litigated in the High Court and the Court of Appeal.196 
In New Zealand, there is no automatic right to appeal a Tribunal decision; the 
court may choose in its discretion to consider a question of law that is of suf-
ficient “general or public importance.”197 Thus, by dismissing Teitiota’s two 
applications for leave, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal deemed 
the question of whether Kiribati migrants could obtain legal status in New 
Zealand as lacking in national importance.198 The High Court likely realized 
that the number of people claiming to be “climate change refugees” would 
only increase as sea level continues to rise.199 Teitiota served as a test case, 
setting a significant precedent that applicants fleeing the impacts of climate 
change would likely be unsuccessful.200 The strong rejection of leave comes 
as a disappointment not only for Teitiota and his family, but also for all Pacif-
ic islanders hoping to remain in New Zealand.201 
1. Can the International Community Be a Persecutor? 
The government of Kiribati is certainly not the cause of rising sea levels 
or environmental degradation.202 As Teitiota conceded, the Kiribati govern-
ment was more than willing to explore innovations and adaptation measures 
to combat climate change.203 Absent government action, inability or unwill-
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ingness, it is difficult to identify a human agent that causes the harms associ-
ated with climate change.204 Teitiota attempted to surmount this hurdle by 
claiming that the international community, by emitting the greenhouse gases 
associated with climate change, was the human agent.205 This argument re-
flects the sentiments of President Tong, who called upon “those countries 
which have reaped benefits from the destruction of the environment to assist 
those who now have to pay the price of these irreversible processes.”206 He 
went so far as to say that the actions by greenhouse gas emitters “to secure 
benefits at the cost of others could only be compared to an act of terrorism—
eco-terrorism if you wish.”207 
The prospect of industrialized nations having obligations to compensate 
developing nations for their production of greenhouse gas emissions is not 
new.208 In 2002, Tuvalu, a neighboring Pacific state, threatened to bring suit 
in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States for failing 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and endangering Tuvalu’s survival.209 In 
2011, Palau, another small Pacific island, called upon the United Nations 
General Assembly to seek an ICJ Advisory Opinion regarding state responsi-
bility for transboundary harms caused by greenhouse gas emissions.210 
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Although the link between industrialized nations and climate change is 
well established, claims against these nations for failure to regulate green-
house gas emissions are unlikely to succeed in domestic courts because of 
sovereign immunity.211 Since all states have contributed to emissions, it would 
be extremely difficult to quantify the harm caused by any one particular 
state.212 Although some have suggested that this harm could be calculated in 
proportion to the emissions of each state, such a “polluter pays” system 
would “treat humans like carbon particles that can be traded” and “be detri-
mental to the interests of both the countries of origins and possible countries 
of admission and refuge.”213 Moreover, these emissions do not necessarily 
violate international law.214 Although many international instruments refer-
ence a right to a healthy environment, they do not create a legally cognizable 
right to be free from climate change.215 
2. Could Teitiota Have Demonstrated Persecution Based on a Convention 
Ground? 
Teitiota’s case illustrates the difficulty of characterizing climate change 
displacement as persecution on account of one of the five Refugee Conven-
tion grounds.216 The New Zealand Immigration Service has emphasized, both 
in Teitiota’s case and earlier appeals, that the environmental and economic 
impacts of climate change are indiscriminate.217 Although the impacts of cli-
mate change are disproportionately felt in resource-poor countries, this par-
ticularized impact is not due to the characteristics or beliefs of their inhabit-
ants.218 
Teitiota did not attempt to argue, as others have in the past, that he faced 
persecution as a member of a particular social group under the Refugee Con-
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vention.219 The omission of this argument was likely a deliberate one on the 
part of Teitiota’s attorney, as such a claim would have been difficult if not 
impossible to establish.220 Refugee law requires that such a group be “con-
nected by a fundamental, immutable characteristic other than the risk of per-
secution itself.”221 Thus, the shared risk of climate change faced by all I-
Kiribati could not constitute the unifying characteristic of a particular social 
group.222 
Even if he could have identified such a characteristic—his lack of eco-
nomic opportunity, for example—he would also have needed to demonstrate 
that the Kiribati government had marginalized that group.223 Several years 
before, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority heard a claim 
from a family of seven Tuvaluan citizens based on the environmental and 
economic difficulties they faced as members of a lower socio-economic 
group.224 They argued that the Tuvalu government, by failing to improve their 
living conditions, had been unwilling to protect their particular social 
group.225 Their claim failed because there was simply no evidence that the 
government had treated them any differently from their countrymen.226 Alt-
hough the circumstances Teitiota faced in Kiribati were bleak, a claim that he 
was a member of a particular social group would certainly have been de-
nied.227 
3. Are Future Claims Under the Refugee Convention Entirely Precluded? 
Although Teitiota’s claim ultimately failed, the High Court did not hold 
that Refugee Convention protections could never be extended to climate-
induced migrants.228 This leaves open the possibility that future claims brought 
by individuals fleeing climate change might prove successful.229 Moving for-
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ward, it is possible that an asylum seeker who is fleeing a situation similar to 
Teitiota’s could be granted refugee protection if harm resulting from any of 
the five stipulated convention grounds exists contemporaneously with climate 
change.230 For example, sufficient grounds for relief may arise where gov-
ernment policies contribute to environmental destruction and harm particular 
social groups that depend on subsistence agriculture.231 
Nevertheless, the possibility left open by the High Court is a narrow 
one.232 Relief under the Refugee Convention is limited to states with govern-
ments that have caused, either directly or indirectly, the suffering of a group 
of people on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or mem-
bership in a particular social group.233 Kiribati and other states facing climate 
change should certainly not aspire to such a draconian option for relief.234 
4. Could the Definition of “Refugee” Be Expanded by Law? 
In Teitiota, the High Court expressly stated that expanding the definition 
of refugee is not a job for the judiciary and could not occur absent legislative 
action.235 The court thereby acknowledged that New Zealand could grant ref-
ugee status to asylum seekers outside the scope of the Refugee Convention if 
it broadened the definition of refugee by law.236 Although the Refugee Con-
vention’s textual definition of refugee has not changed, some states have al-
ready chosen to expand the definition through legislation.237 For example, the 
Swedish Aliens Act specifically extends asylum protection to those displaced 
by an environmental disaster.238 That provision is limited, however, and only 
intended to apply to people displaced by sudden disasters.239 Even if New 
Zealand were to adopt such a provision, it would not extend protection to 
people displaced by slow-onset changes like sea level rise.240 
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Approximately seventy to eighty nation states have adopted regional or 
multilateral treaties that expand the definition of “refugee” beyond the Refu-
gee Convention.241 The 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Gov-
erning Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa includes persons flee-
ing “events seriously disturbing public order” in its expanded definitions of 
refugee.242 The 1984 Cartegena Declaration on Refugees in Latin America 
includes in its definition of refugee “persons who have fled their country, be-
cause their lives, safety, or freedom have been threatened by generalized vio-
lence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human 
rights or other circumstances seriously disturbing public order.”243 
Whether refugee protection could actually be stretched far enough to 
apply to climate-induced migrants, however, has yet to be seen.244 A sudden-
onset natural disaster may trigger protection under Swedish law or qualify as 
a circumstance “seriously disturbing public order” under one of the regional 
treaties.245  An asylum seeker fleeing a slow-onset phenomenon, however, 
such as the sea-level rise in Kiribati would be unlikely to meet even an ex-
panded definition of refugee.246 
Moreover, these regions are unlikely destinations for people fleeing is-
land states in the Pacific.247 Unfortunately for Teitiota and others like him, 
Australia and New Zealand are not parties to these regional agreements.248 
Despite years of advocacy and continued litigation, legislatures in New Zea-
land and Australia have made no indication of plans to alter the traditional 
definition of refugee.249 In a claim similar to Teitiota’s, a Kiribati national 
submitted to Australia’s Refugee Review Tribunal that Australia should fol-
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low the lead of other jurisdictions that have allowed people fleeing environ-
mental problems to seek asylum. 250  In response, the Tribunal said that 
“[w]hile it may be true that these developments have occurred elsewhere in 
consideration of human flight, the Tribunal is bound to apply the law as it 
currently stands in Australia.”251 Although Teitiota did not make this argu-
ment in New Zealand, it is likely that the Tribunal and High Court would 
have responded similarly.252 Teitiota’s attorney “candidly submitted . . . that 
he had been unable to find any New Zealand, Australian, Canadian, United 
Kingdom, United States, or European authority which had extended the pro-
tection of the Refugee Convention to a person adversely affected by climate 
change.”253 
The Refugee Convention—even when stretched to its broadest scope—
is unlikely to be an effective legal instrument for those fleeing climate 
change.254 For Teitiota and other Pacific islanders fleeing their homes, inter-
national refugee law is too confining as a mechanism for protection because it 
only confers rights to individuals who have crossed an international border 
and meet all the enumerated criteria.255 For the majority of people facing sea 
level rise, other methods of protection need to be developed.256 
5. The Limitations of Judicial Responses 
More broadly, litigation is simply not a feasible option for most climate 
change-displaced persons.257 Not only is litigation a lengthy process with no 
guarantee of relief, it requires significant financial resources.258 Although Tei-
tiota had access to an attorney who specializes in human rights law, that level 
of representation is scarce and costly to attain.259 Even if litigation were to be 
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successful, the legal weight of a judicial holding is not unqualified.260 As ref-
ugee law expert Jane McAdam points out, “[w]hile judicial interpretations 
may lead to broadened interpretations of the law, they are reliant on good test 
cases, cogent legal arguments by counsel for expansion, and acceptance by 
Parliament (which may be able to legislate to overturn the implications of the 
decision for the future).”261 Courts can interpret the law with an eye towards 
changed circumstances and policies, but they should not be relied upon to 
provide protection to climate-induced migrants.262 Given the limited scope of 
the Refugee Convention and the limited reach of litigation, many states that 
grapple with climate change have instead focused their attention on alterna-
tive legal instruments.263 
B. What Legal Options Remain? 
The case of Teitiota highlights that current international laws have 
proven inadequate in responding to and protecting the I-Kiribati who wish to 
leave their “sinking” home.264 Despite efforts to adapt to climate change on 
the part of local governments, the needs of environmentally displaced persons 
in the Pacific will continue to go unmet.265 Kiribati’s President Tong has 
pleaded that “[t]here is no way we can do it on our own, and I think that we 
deserve and we demand that the international community come to the par-
ty.”266 Although there are existing international mechanisms for individuals 
fleeing natural disasters, those protections are often temporary and do not ex-
tend to “disaster in slow motion,” such as the slow-onset consequences of sea 
level rise.267 The relative slowness of climate change impacts in the Pacific 
gives individual states and the international community the rare opportunity 
to plan their responses to displacement preemptively.268 Proposed solutions to 
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address climate-prompted migration are wide-ranging.269 The following sec-
tion evaluates the effectiveness of each of these proposals. 
1. Discretionary Grounds at a National Level 
The High Court in Teitiota expressly acknowledged humanitarian pro-
tection as another avenue for relief.270 Although eligibility requirements differ 
from state to state, many states already offer humanitarian mechanisms to 
remain.271 This form of relief is often discretionary, and the rights provided 
may be temporary or otherwise limited.272  Protection on humanitarian or 
compassionate grounds may take into account how long a person has been in 
the country or be triggered only after a failed asylum application, as is the law 
in Australia.273 In some states, discretionary humanitarian relief has been spe-
cifically extended to people fleeing environmental disasters.274 
In New Zealand, the Immigration Act allows a person to remain in the 
state if there are exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature that 
would make it unjust or unduly harsh for the person to be deported, and it 
would not be contrary to the public interest to permit the person to remain.275 
Unfortunately, that avenue was unavailable to Teitiota and his family because 
overstaying their prior visas precluded them from obtaining an immigration 
permit on humanitarian grounds.276 By acknowledging the “plight” of envi-
ronmental degradation in Kiribati and the “predicament” faced by Teitiota 
and his family, the High Court left open the possibility that it would have 
granted Teitiota humanitarian relief had he been eligible.277 Despite the High 
Court’s nod to humanitarian concerns, discretionary protection would have 
been unlikely; had the High Court reached the issue, it would have been simi-
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larly concerned that granting relief to Teitiota would incentivize a flood of 
migrants fleeing Kiribati and similarly situated nations.278 
2. Multilateral Responses 
Over twenty years have passed since the UNFCCC was signed into ac-
tion, but no binding agreement exists to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.279 
Whether the international community has a duty to respond continues to be 
widely debated.280 The UNFCCC plays an important and vital role in this de-
bate.281 By acknowledging that states need to share this responsibility, the 
UNFCCC has acted as a catalyst for developed nations to extend protections 
to developing nations.282 It calls on developed nations, as the largest emitters 
of greenhouse gases and thus the primary drivers of climate change, to “take 
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”283 
Spearheading this effort requires not only reducing emissions, but also 
providing financial and technical support to developing nations.284 
Significantly, the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework specifically rec-
ognized an international obligation to respond to climate-induced migra-
tion.285 Prior to this framework, the UNFCCC had not recognized migration 
as a rational adaptation strategy.286 Doing so demonstrated a more compre-
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hensive understanding of climate change and its impacts.287 Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that since the Cancun Adaptation Framework was negotiated, 
more funding has been channeled towards developing mechanisms for reloca-
tion and migration.288 
Despite these advancements, non-binding multinational agreements will 
continue to have limited impact because compliance is entirely voluntary.289 
States are not required to develop migration schemes or offer protection to 
individuals displaced by climate change, and thus face no legal repercussions 
when they do not. 290  Absent mandatory compliance, these initiatives are 
simply aspirational statements.291 Moving forward, it remains unlikely that 
multilateral negotiations will lead to a binding international agreement on 
climate change displacement.292 The voices of developed nations continue to 
overshadow the voices of Pacific island nations like Kiribati.293 Phillip Muller, 
the Marshall Islands ambassador to the United Nations, has stated that “[a]t 
the current negotiating sessions and climate change meetings, nobody is truly 
addressing the legal and human rights effects of climate change.”294 
Furthermore, the UNFCCC’s reputation has been tarnished by a “history 
of inaction” and a “reluctance to incorporate human rights issues.”295 Alt-
hough the Cancun Adaptation Framework has the potential to chart a new 
course towards migration programs, the UNFCCC has traditionally focused 
on prevention and mitigation rather than adaptation.296 This lack of progress 
is understandable, given the complex and multifaceted nature of climate-
induced migration and the impossibility of finding a one-size-fits-all solu-
tion.297 An international forum like the UNFCCC is poorly-suited to compre-
hensively address all these needs and lacks the expertise and the operational 
capacity to implement timely and durable responses.298 Nevertheless, interna-
tional climate change dialogues and negotiations, such as the Nansen Initia-
tive and the Bellagio Deliberations, will continue to be vital for drawing at-
tention to the need for sharing responsibility and securing financing for the 
adaptation programs of developing nations.299 
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3. Regional Instruments 
Regional agreements have proven to be better suited to addressing the 
needs of climate change displacement.300 Unlike top-down international initi-
atives, which risk being viewed as impositions by outsiders rather than im-
provements, regional adaptation schemes involve and empower local com-
munities.301 They are better able to develop strategies that comport to the 
needs and capacities of the parties involved, and thus have stronger support 
and commitment from those parties.302 In addition, they are able to take ad-
vantage of political and economic relationships between states.303 Building on 
existing ties supports the development of coordinated and complementary na-
tional strategies, which is crucial to the future success of migration schemes.304 
Efforts by the Pacific Islands Forum and SPREP illustrate the ad-
vantages of regional level action.305 They have been effective at bringing to-
gether regional leaders and pinpointing the specific needs of their parties, 
such as improving technology, education, and information exchange. 306 
SPREP initiatives have proven to be particularly successful.307 Since its crea-
tion, there have been innovative advancements in “ecosystem management, 
waste and pollution management, environmental governance, and communi-
cations education and knowledge.”308 Initiatives led by SPREP have success-
fully raised funds for climate change adaptation and mitigation.309 
Despite these advancements, other regional initiatives in the Pacific have 
been described as “sporadic and noncommittal.”310 For example, although the 
PIFACC provides the PICT and their global partners with a policy framework, 
the instrument does not create binding rights and obligations under interna-
tional law.311 In fact, the PIFACC midterm review showed that awareness of 
the framework was low and a lack of monitoring and reporting procedures 
made it difficult to measure its success.312 Similarly, the Niue Declaration has 
called for greater international intervention, yet its power to actually influence 
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international climate negotiations is quite limited.313 The future success of the 
PIFACC and the Niue Declaration depend on the implementation of national 
climate change initiatives and the support—financial, institutional, and tech-
nological—of international development partners.314 Thus far, both have been 
lacking.315 
Although the success level of regional programs in the Pacific is varied, 
these regional approaches are essential to increasing the adaptive capacity in 
the region.316 They increase access to resources and help ensure that regional 
adaptation measures are coordinated and complementary.317 
C. Protection Through Regional Customary Law 
Although Teitiota demonstrates that the Pacific region currently lacks 
legislation and case law granting legal protection to climate-induced migrants, 
it is possible that state practice could eventually lead to the development of a 
regional custom.318 Absent the rollout of unprecedented adaptation strategies, 
the plight of the Pacific island states will only worsen with time.319 Eventually, 
there could be no territory to which refugee seekers would be able to re-
turn.320 Once that eventuality is reached, the requirements to establish an 
opinio juris would be a low threshold to surpass since the very survival of the 
Pacific islands would be at stake.321 
It is arguable that New Zealand and Australia, through geography and 
history, have greater responsibility than the rest of the international communi-
ty for people displaced from the Pacific islands.322 Unlike Kiribati, they are 
thinly populated and could potentially accommodate diverse uses of their ter-
ritory.323 Australia and New Zealand have already begun addressing the reset-
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tlement needs of neighboring states through traditional migration schemes, 
such as PAC in New Zealand and Australian-led training programs.324 Both 
states are members of regional cooperation organizations, such as the Pacific 
Islands Forum and SPREP, and are involved in the implementation of the 
agreements they create, such as PIFACC and the Niue Declaration.325 Moving 
forward, the continued strengthening of these regional initiatives could signal 
the emergence of a new pattern and practice, eventually leading to the for-
mation of binding custom.326 A bottom-up approach to the creation of legal 
protection is preferable to a top-down relocation policy imposed upon vulner-
able states in that it can reflect the region’s unique needs and capabilities.327 
This style of lawmaking will, however, be lengthy.328 The governments 
of Australia and New Zealand have been explicit in their state practices re-
garding environmental migration from Pacific nations.329 Australia’s Labor 
Party denied that it has a unilateral obligation to protect climate-induced mi-
grants, instead calling for a collaborative international approach with other 
nations.330 In 2009, a spokesperson for the Climate Change Minister stated 
that “permanent migration may eventually be the only option for some people. 
The issue will need to be dealt with by regional governments.”331 The De-
partment of Foreign Affairs and Trade has stated that the government was not 
considering “the possibility of forced re-location from Pacific island countries 
such as Kiribati and Tuvalu[.]”332 In 2008, the New Zealand government an-
nounced that it “has a proven history of providing assistance where needed in 
the Pacific, and that our approach to environmentally displaced persons 
would be consistent with this.”333 Teitiota’s failed claim indicates, however, 
that this assistance has not stretched very far.334 
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These statements indicate that the governments are attuned to the needs 
of the neighboring islands, but have not accepted unilateral responsibility to 
address their needs.335 Although an interesting thought experiment, waiting 
for a regional custom to develop is reactive and not a viable means to address 
environmental migration from island states.336 States must develop preemp-
tive solutions long before such a regional custom crystallizes.337 
CONCLUSION 
Among the multifaceted impacts of climate change, human migration 
has become an escalating concern. The troubling fact is that for people like 
Ioane Teitiota, leaving home also means leaving behind basic legal rights. 
The Refugee Convention does not extend to climate-induced migrants, and 
current international laws offer inadequate protection to people fleeing their 
island homes. Litigation to fit climate-induced migrants within the refugee 
mold have thus far failed, and the prospect of expanding the definition of 
refugee in the neighboring Pacific states of New Zealand and Australia seems 
unlikely. 
Rather than concentrating on litigating claims under the Refugee 
Convention, states responding to displacement should focus on alternative 
legal and policy instruments. In the Pacific, the slow onset of climate change 
impacts provides an unique opportunity for responses to be planned. States 
must take advantage of the time they have now to develop and implement 
effective strategies for migration. Moving forward, a combination of national, 
regional, and international legal and policy responses working in coordination 
will be the most effective approach. International efforts, although limited in 
capacity, are crucial to drawing attention to climate change displacement and 
reaffirming that the international community has a responsibility to respond. 
International assistance is necessary, and must be informed by local 
knowledge and priorities in order to be effective. Regional efforts are best-
suited to enlighten international discourse, as they help identify specific needs 
and funnel financial and technical support to where it is most needed. By 
enhancing their bonds with global partners and stakeholders through regional 
agreements, states in the Pacific region will be more successful at adapting to 
climate change and mitigating its harmful effects. 
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